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When Fox television entered the US market, advertising levels on NBC, CBS,
and ABC rose from 7 minutes per hour in 1989 to around 9 minutes in 1998.1
This suggests that entry may induce higher ad levels. However, standard models
of advertising-￿nanced media platforms, such as Anderson and Coate (2005),
predict that entry should lower ad levels (and raise per-viewer ad prices). They
also predict that mergers should have the opposite e⁄ect, of raising ad levels and
lowering ad prices.2 Some support for this standard prediction is provided by
the radio industry executive cited in Anderson and Coate (2005), who argued
that ad levels rise after a merger.
Some empirical studies indicate predictions opposite from the standard the-
ory. Focusing on local radio markets, Brown and Williams (2002) ￿nd that
local ownership concentration slightly increases ad prices. Brown and Alexan-
der (2005) report a similar result in the TV market (interestingly, they ￿nd that
the ad volume might increase as well). Jeziorski (2011) ￿nds that ad levels fall
with concentration.
Most studies indicate mixed evidence or no clear-cut result in one or the other
direction. Chipty (2006) ￿nds no systematic relationship between ownership
structure and ad prices (or ad levels). Sweeting (2010) investigates advertising
levels using a panel of data from music stations based on airplay data from 1998
to 2001. He does not ￿nd clear evidence of a relationship between ownership of
several stations and the advertising level. In a structural analysis of two-sided
radio markets, Tyler Mooney (2011) ￿nds that ad prices and ad volume may
increase or decrease with concentration.3
Standard theory models assume that viewers single-home and that there is no
advertising congestion. The former means that each platform has a "monopoly
bottleneck" position over advertising to its own viewers, and the latter means
that attention spans are unlimited.
In this short paper, we explore two potential avenues that can reverse the
results of standard models and help to reconcile theory with empirical ￿nd-
ings. We also argue that introducing competition for advertisers can imply that
mergers reduce media di⁄erentiation, which is in sharp contrast to the received
wisdom following Steiner (1952). We ￿rst sketch how Anderson and Peitz (2011)
introduce competition for advertisers by allowing for advertising congestion of
viewers who mix between channels. Competition for limited consumer attention
1See TV Dimensions 2000 (18th Ed), Media Dimensions, Inc.
2Gal-Or and Dukes (2006) analyze the pro￿tability of media mergers in a somewhat di⁄er-
ent setting. They postulate that advertisers compete in the market place and that advertisers
and media platforms engage in bilateral bargaining over the advertising price. Advertising
is informative as in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and, thus, imposes a negative externality
on the competitor in the market place. Gal-Or and Dukes ￿nd that ￿small￿ mergers may be
pro￿table when ￿large￿ mergers are not. The driving force for their results is that a media
merger a⁄ects the bargaining position of the media platform vis-a-vis the advertiser. They
con￿rm the standard result that a merger leads to higher advertising levels.
3Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) ￿nd that mergers of Canadian newspapers did not
change ad prices. This is consistent with received theory because when there are subscription
prices the ad level is independent of the number of ￿rms (Anderson and Coate, 2005).
1brings direct competition between platforms for advertisers. In contrast to the
standard predictions, a merger between ad-￿nanced platforms reduces ad levels
and increases ad prices. The reason is that a merged ￿rm internalizes more the
congestion problem. Conversely, more platform entry has the opposite e⁄ect
because congestion is internalized less with a larger overall congestion level.
The presence of multi-homing viewers also generates competition for ad-
vertisers. To highlight this property, Anderson, Foros and Kind (2011) assume
that advertisers are willing to pay nothing for a second impression with a viewer
who has already been reached. Competing platforms can then charge advertis-
ers only for viewers they deliver exclusively. Anderson, Foros and Kind (2011)
term this the Principle of Incremental Pricing. However, two merging plat-
forms can charge advertisers for viewers who visit both platforms. If some
viewers multi-home, a merger will consequently raise the price per ad even if
the total number of viewers stays constant. Again, the result contrasts with
the predictions of the standard models of media economics. Competition for
advertisers due to multi-homing viewers may also alter the standard prediction
that a merger among ad-￿nanced platforms leads to more program diversity.
The reason is that while competing ad-￿nanced platforms have incentives to
attract exclusive viewers through di⁄erentiation, a shared viewer has the same
value for merged platforms as an exclusive viewer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the
standard model without competition for advertisers, following the lines of An-
derson and Coate (2005). The advertising congestion framework is introduced
in section 3, while the consequences of multi-homing viewers for advertising
competition are discussed in section 4. Section 5 provides some concluding
remarks.
2 Backdrop
Consider n platforms that provide program content to attract viewers. They
deliver these eyeballs to advertisers. Advertising revenue is the sole source of
￿nance to platforms, and advertisers are assumed to be price takers (so there
is no bargaining over prices). Platform i￿ s pro￿t is thus ￿i = Piai, i = 1;:::n,
where Pi is the price per ad and ai is the number of ads aired. We shall shortly
break this pro￿t down to break out the role of viewer demand.
Content is attractive to viewers, but the embodied ads are a nuisance. Under
the standard assumption, viewers are assumed to be annoyed by ads, so that
nuisance is the "price" to viewers from watching. Viewers￿tastes over platforms
are di⁄erentiated. Assume that each viewer makes a discrete choice over which
platform to watch, corresponding to a single-homing assumption on viewers. Let
then Ni (ai;a￿i) be the number of viewers (demand) for platform i as a function
of its ad level and the vector of ad levels, a￿i, of its competitors. The functions
Ni (:) are then just like those of a standard discrete choice (substitute products)
demand system, decreasing in own advertising, and (weakly) increasing in the
advertising level of each rival.
2On the advertiser side, assume that there is no advertising clutter, so that
all ads on a platform are registered by all consumers watching. Furthermore, let
advertisers have di⁄erent willingness to pay for reaching viewers (impressions).
Assume that the advertiser willingness-to-pay for advertising on each platform
is a linear function of the number of viewers on the platform, so there are
constant returns to reaching prospective customers. This means that targeting
by platform is not an issue: viewers on one platform are not inherently more
valuable.
Then we can rank advertisers in terms of decreasing willingness to pay per
eyeball, from large to small in standard fashion, to generate a demand curve per
eyeball. Call this p(a) so that the price per ad is P = p(ai)Ni (ai;a￿i). Hence,
under these assumptions, we can write
￿i = aip(ai)Ni (ai;a￿i)
= R(ai)Ni (ai;a￿i)
where R(ai) is the revenue per ad per viewer.4









which says (equivalently) that the elasticity of revenue per viewer should equal
the viewer demand elasticity. In this we recognize a variation on the stan-




￿i = (pi ￿ ci)Ni (pi;p￿i)
where now Ni (pi;p￿i) is the demand addressed to ￿rm i and pi is (temporarily)
the price i sets for its product, while ci is its marginal cost (and p￿i is the vector








which, in elasticity form, gives the inverse elasticity (Lerner) rule for pricing.
The parallels are now easily developed. First, from (2), lower prices result (be-
cause 1=(pi ￿ ci) decreases in pi) when the equilibrium value of ￿N0
i (pi;p￿i)=Ni (pi;p￿i)
increases following a change (in, say, the number of platforms, n). Likewise,
from (1), as long as R0 (a)=R(a) is decreasing in a (which holds under the weak
condition that lnR(a) be concave), then lower ad levels result whenever the
equilibrium value of ￿N0
i (ai;a￿i)=Ni (ai;a￿i) increases.
Consider ￿rst the e⁄ects of entry of platforms at a symmetric equilibrium:
under regular conditions, the right-hand side expressions of (2) and (1) decrease.
4We have included here no costs: it su¢ ces that the costs of screening ads are the same as
those for programs, so the cost of an hour of programming is independent of its composition.








where the transport parameter t measures the degree of platform di⁄erentiation.
For the logit (see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992) this ratio is (n ￿
1)=(￿n), where the taste variance parameter ￿ measures the degree of platform
di⁄erentiation in the multinomial logit. Both expressions are increasing in n. In
the di⁄erentiated products context, this means simply that more competition
leads to lower prices. Transposing this result to the media economics context,
entry leads to lower equilibrium ad levels. The reason is that competition for
viewers plays out as competition in nuisance levels (both price and ad levels are
nuisances). More competition reduces the equilibrium nuisance level. The lower
equilibrium level of ads implies a higher equilibrium price per viewer per ad, as
we move back up the per viewer advertiser demand curve.
Consider next the e⁄ects of a merger. In the price-competition version of
the di⁄erentiated products model, a merger leads the merging ￿rms to raise
prices, as they internalize the cross-substitution in demand to the sibling prod-
uct. Under strategic complementarity of prices, rivals follow suit, giving the
merged ￿rms a further ￿llip to raise prices (see Deneckere and Davidson, 1985).
Transposing these results to the media economics context, a merger leads to
higher equilibrium ad levels across the board. Correspondingly, from the de-
mand function per ad per viewer, prices per ad per viewer fall under merger. If
viewer numbers contract as ad levels rise, ad prices fall from the twin e⁄ects of
fewer viewers, and lower price per ad per viewer.
3 Advertising Congestion
Anderson and de Palma (2009) analyze information congestion by assuming
that consumer attention spans are limited, so consumers can only process and
register some, but not all, of the advertising messages to which they are ex-
posed. The analysis considers "open access" to attention (for example, through
billboards, or bulk mail) and deploys an analysis of attention as a common
property resource, so access restriction by platforms is not considered.
Anderson and Peitz (2011) bring this approach full square into media eco-
nomics by analyzing oligopoly platforms choosing how much to advertise while
taking into account the e⁄ects on overall attention.5 This implies that the
free-rider congestion problem is internalized more by larger platforms.
To see how this works for introducing competition for advertisers, consider
￿rst the situation with an invariant amount of time spent by a representative
viewer on each platform (so there is no advertising nuisance yet: this is treated
below).
5Rysman (2004) notes that congestion e⁄ects can a⁄ect the demand for advertising, al-
though he does not draw out the e⁄ects of competition for attention across platforms.
4Let ￿i be the amount of time spent on platform i = 1;:::;n and let ￿0 be
the time spent not watching (the outside option), and normalize the total time
available to 1, so that
n X
i=0
￿i = 1. If Platform i airs ai ads, then there are two
conditions that must be satis￿ed for an ad to communicate successfully with a
viewer. First, the viewer must be on the platform when the ad is aired. This
happens with probability ￿i (assuming that ads are uniformly distributed over
the time segment). Second, the viewer must register the ad even if it is seen.
The idea here is that attention is limited: suppose a ￿xed number ￿ of ads seen
are registered. In sum, then, the chance of registering a given ad on platform i
is ￿=A, where A =
n X
j=1
￿jaj is the expected total number of ads seen.
On the advertiser side, we again rank them in decreasing order of willingness
to pay to contact prospective customers, so that they are willing to pay p(a) if
they make contact and break into the viewer￿ s attention span. With congestion,
the willingness to pay becomes p(a)￿=A, where A ads are seen by the viewer
but only ￿ are retained .
Thus, if there are ai ads on platform i, the ad price is the willingness to pay










￿i, i = 1;:::;n:
Notice that platform interdependence comes from the joint assumption that the
A ads are seen across multiple channels (so viewers are mixing) and that there
is advertising congestion.6 Note that if ￿ were to exceed A then there would be
no congestion, and no interdependence across platforms for advertisers. Then
ad levels per platform would be simply the "monopoly" level (i.e., an ad level
satisfying R0 (ai) = 0, independently of ￿i), and there would be no n e⁄ect.
Consider a symmetric situation, i.e., ￿i = ￿ for all i 2 f1;:::;ng, with com-














The left-hand side is a decreasing function of a under the standard condition that
lnp(a) is concave.7 This implies that a￿ now increases with n. The intuition is
6The mixing of programs by itself does not a⁄ect the results of the standard model; see
e.g. Peitz and Valletti (2008).
7To see this, note that
a￿R0(a￿)
R(a￿) = 1 +
p0(a￿)a￿
p(a￿) , and the elasticity term is decreasing in
a￿ when pp00 ￿ (p0)
2 < 0, which is the condition for lnp to be strictly concave.
5that the smaller the number of ￿rms the more they internalize the congestion
externality, so that more ￿rms leads to more ads. Consequently, the price per
ad per viewer-hour falls. The price per ad falls for that reason and because the
amount of time spent on each platform (￿) falls.
The merger analysis follows along similar lines. A common owner of two
platforms internalizes the congestion externality to a greater extent than do
independent platforms, because it recognizes the bene￿cial spill-over on its sib-
ling platform. The lower resulting ad level causes other platforms to become
relatively larger participants in total ads, and so they have a greater incentive
to reduce ad congestion as well. Consequently, prices per ad per viewer-hour
rise, moving up the advertiser demand curve. Insofar as lower ad levels would
encourage viewers, the price per ad rises.
The above analysis treated viewer behavior as exogenous. Anderson and
Peitz (2011) introduce nuisance as a factor determining viewer choice of how
much time to spend on each competing platform by postulating a CES form for
viewing utility, with a quality time formulation. They write si (1 ￿ ai) as the
quality-time per platform. Here, si is seen as the program quality. This utility is
maximized under a time constraint to generate time demands per platform as a
function of ad nuisance. Programs are horizontally di⁄erentiated, augmented by
vertical di⁄erentiation via the qualities si. Similar comparative static properties
hold regarding the e⁄ects of entry and mergers.
4 Multi-Homing Viewers
In the analysis in the previous section, congestion clutter drives the interaction
between platforms in their competition for advertisers. The complementary
research in Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2011) - henceforth AFK - closes down the
congestion e⁄ect, and emphasizes viewer heterogeneity by having some viewers
visit more than one platform. Multi-homing is thus the crucial element in their
approach.8
In contrast to the model in Section 3, AFK assume that the strategic variable
is the price per ad.9 To emphasize the key di⁄erences in competition when
allowing for multi-homing viewers, they initially abstract from viewer nuisance
e⁄ects and assume that there is a ￿xed number of viewers on each platform.
They further suppose that there is no bene￿t from reaching the same viewer
more than once (an analogous assumption is made by Athey, Calvano, and
Gans, 2011).10 This will serve to highlight the property that advertising prices
might increase subsequent to a merger between two media platforms.
8Credit is due to Ambrus and Reisinger (2007) for recognizing the importance of the
single-homing assumptions, and modelling a two-sided market structure with endogenous
multi-homing viewers.
9Crampes, Haritchabalet, and Jullien (2009) consider the price version of the Anderson-
Coate (2005) model.
10All that is needed for the main results is that the value of a second impression is less than
that of a ￿rst one.
6We shall now let ￿i denote the number of viewers on platform i (rather
than the time each viewer spends at the platform, as in the previous section),
and assume that each ad on platform i is seen by all viewers on that platform.
Furthermore, let b denote each advertiser￿ s willingness to pay per ad impression,
and assume that the number of advertisers is ￿xed at A. Then, if i￿ s viewers
are all exclusive to its platform, i can set a price per ad of b￿i and post A ads.
Now suppose that some of i0s viewers are also shared with platform j (and
only platform j for the moment). The number of exclusive viewers of platform
i is de￿ned as ￿
e
i = ￿i ￿ ￿ij, where ￿ij is the number of overlapping viewers
of platforms i and j. Then the equilibrium ad price on platform i is b￿
e
i, so
that i can only charge for its exclusive viewers. To see this, notice that at such
prices advertisers will post ads on both platforms. A higher price will net no
advertisers, a lower one will gain no advertisers. This property is termed by
AFK the Principle of Incremental Pricing, and constitutes a natural converse
to the standard Bertrand pricing result.
AFK extend this result to allow for advertising nuisance on the viewer side
in the following way. Let the number of exclusive consumers on a platform fall
with the number of ads on the platform. Viewers rationally anticipate ad levels
when deciding which platform(s) to join, while platforms and advertisers ratio-
nally anticipate viewer numbers. Platforms set prices per ad, and advertisers
choose where to place ads. AFK show that there exists a unique (pure strat-
egy) equilibrium in which each platform sets a price per ad equal to b times the
number of exclusive viewers per platform.11 Each advertiser places an ad on
each platform: each platform is able to extract in price from advertisers only
the value of the exclusive consumers it delivers. The property extends readily
to several platforms ￿the equilibrium prices are incremental.
We now turn to the implications for entry and mergers. Entry eats away at
platforms￿￿xed bases of exclusive viewers, and therefore reduces the price per
ad. In this simple formulation the price per ad per exclusive viewer remains b.
However, the price per ad per actual viewer falls because of the larger number
of actual viewers relative to exclusive ones.12
A merger between two platforms renders exclusive to the joint platform those
viewers in the intersection of the platforms. Before the merger, viewers common
to the merging parties cannot be charged for in equilibrium, but after merger,
they can (provided they are not on other platforms too). This implies that ad
prices rise with a merger. In addition, analogous to the discussion above for
entry, the average price per ad per viewer will also rise.
Allowing for multi-homing viewers (and a lesser value of a second impression)
also yields new insight into platforms￿incentives to di⁄erentiate. Ad-￿nanced
platforms chase exclusive viewers, and so competing ad-￿nanced platforms will
want to di⁄erentiate to attract more exclusive viewers. This contrasts with the
classic duplication result of Steiner (1952), and it contrasts with his prediction
that a merger between ad-￿nanced platforms will lead to more diversity. Be-
11This number is determined from the condition that there be A ads on each platform.
12In this simpli￿ed model, the number of ads per platform stays constant at A.
7cause platforms only bene￿t from exclusive consumers, their tastes will a⁄ect
platforms￿programming choices, while the tastes of multi-homing viewers are
ignored.
One major shortcoming of the model outlined above is that all advertisers
have the same valuation per viewer (b). In AFK, the analysis is extended to the
case of heterogenous advertisers. On the consumer side, AFK use a speci￿c hor-
izontal di⁄erentiation model of viewer choice, namely that in Anderson, Foros,
and Kind (2010). This appends a multi-homing choice to the Hotelling-model,
and allows di⁄erent individuals to choose di⁄erent options. Individuals "in the
middle" of the Hotelling line will be most likely to choose two options.13 On
the advertiser side, AFK￿ s model is based on Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003).
E⁄ectively, advertisers with the highest willingness to pay for contacting viewers
will multi-home, the next tranche will advertise on the platform delivering more
viewers, and those at the very bottom will not advertise at all.
AFK put these two sides together with platform competition, assuming plat-
forms directly set prices per ad as their strategies. Their focus is not on mergers
per se, but rather on the relationship between viewer exclusivity, ad nuisance
and platform pro￿tability. One of their most striking results is that two compet-
ing platforms might make higher pro￿ts the greater is consumer nuisance cost of
ads. The intuition for this result, which at ￿rst might seem counter-intuitive, is
that the more a viewer dislikes ads, the less likely it is that s/he will spend time
watching programs on both platforms. The number of exclusive viewers on each
platform is consequently increasing in the nuisance cost. Other things equal,
this will in turn increase platform pro￿ts.14 This leads us to conjecture that
merger incentives may be smaller the greater is the ad nuisance cost. Whether
this is true is to be seen in future research.
5 Concluding remarks
Standard media economics theory cannot accommodate the possibility that
mergers lower ad levels and raise ad prices, or that entry has the opposite
e⁄ects. Empirical evidence is mixed, so the unambiguous results from the stan-
dard theory suggest that some countervailing forces may be missing. In this
paper we have explored the implications of advertising congestion and viewer
multi-homing and found that the predictions of the standard theory are reversed.
The two departures from standard theory that we have explored may well ￿t
di⁄erent media markets, and thus could be seen as complementary (as opposed
to competing) explanations. In Anderson and Peitz (2011), access to viewer
attention is limited and viewers mix between channels. The model seems well-
suited for television and radio insofar as viewers have a ￿xed amount of time to
13Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2010 and 2011) consider a duopoly model, but it can readily
be extended to cover oligopoly using the Vickrey-Salop circle set-up.
14The logic is similar to that underlying the ￿nding of Grossman and Shapiro (1984) that
higher advertising costs can increase ￿rms￿pro￿ts by relaxing price competition through there
being less overlap of informed consumers.
8allocate among channels, and cannot see the ad currently aired on one channel if
they are on another at the time the ad is aired. By contrast, in Anderson, Foros
and Kind (2011), multi-homing viewers are fully exposed to the advertising of
more than one media platform. This better ￿ts magazines and newspapers,
where viewer (or readers) can be exposed simultaneously to the ads of more
than one platform.
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